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After a more than 100 years development, with the influence of two thought 
——Berle-Mean’s Separation of Ownership and Control and Taylor's Scientific Management, 
lots of profound changes have taken place in the enterprise systems and organizational forms 
around the world, and the modern share-holding enterprises replaced the family business 
gradually, and became the dominant form of business. However, by observation of reality, we 
found that modern share-holding enterprise only dominated in large-scale business-oriented 
organizations, while the majority of small and medium enterprises still retain family control 
and management. They follow another logic set different from "scientific management”: 
emphasis on family relations as the core governance model. In the future, whether will this 
enterprise system evolve towards "a modern enterprise system" with the ultimate 
disappearance it, or develop governance mechanisms to match it and make it "always 
maintain the youth"?Under the premise of acknowledge of the existence of family business 
system, utilizing the agency theory paradigm, analyzing the special manifestation and laws of 
agency conflict in the family enterprises, we explore a Corporate governance mechanism to 
match the family enterprises.  
Based on the above-mentioned theory and positive analysis, we come to the below 
conclusion: (1) There are significant agency costs in our family enterprises, which are 
similar to the level of agency costs in the state-owned enterprises; our statement does not 
support the view of Jensen and Meckling "There is no agency cost in the family 
enterprises "; (2) The multi-interest structure makes the family enterprises’ agency issues 
more complex, the nature of their behavior is "the family ties on the basis of blood 
relationship and with the characteristics of altruism". (3) From the particularity of the 
family enterprises, the agent problems result mainly from three aspects, which are 
altruism, family control and self-control. (4)We could optimize our corporate governance 
structure, upgrade governance and improve corporate performance, proceeding from the 
equity structure, the board of directors, corporate culture and incentives mechanism. 
Keywords: Family enterprise governance, Agency theory, Corporate Governance 
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1  总论 
1 
1  总 论 
1.1  研究背景：关于我国家族企业治理的思考 
现实中，家族企业总给人们留有落后、低效率等负面印象，殊不知家族企业是
人类经济生活 古老、 基本的管理方式，翻开企业发展史，几乎是一部又一部的







以上是家族企业，全国每年新生 15 万家民营企业，同时每年又能死亡 10 万多家，










































































































































型企业的发展。据全国工商联调查结果显示： 目前 我国 99％的企业都是中小企业，
其中绝大多数是民营企业。我国 GDP 的 55.6％，工业新增产值的 74.7％，社会销售


































































































1  总论 
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